We find where your systems use RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography and move them to NIST’s post-quantum algorithms, starting with the data that has to stay secret longest.
Executive Order 14412 sets federal deadlines in 2030 and 2031, and directs a FAR rule that would hold contractors to the first.
ML-KEM for key establishment; ML-DSA and SLH-DSA for signatures.
Sets the federal deadlines below and directs a FAR rule for contractors.
New acquisitions must comply.
Or a successor version.
On high-value assets and high-impact systems. The FAR rule would hold covered contractors to the same date.
On the same systems.
Proposed in NIST’s draft IR 8547.
Sources: FIPS 203 (opens in a new tab); Executive Order 14412 (opens in a new tab), 91 FR 38483; OMB M-26-15 (opens in a new tab); NSA’s CNSA 2.0 FAQ (opens in a new tab); NIST IR 8547 (draft) (opens in a new tab).
Traffic encrypted today with RSA or elliptic-curve keys can be recorded now and decrypted once a quantum computer can break those keys. Michele Mosca’s test puts three numbers on that risk, and you can enter your own below.
x + y against z15 > 12
Exposed. Data you protect with RSA or elliptic-curve keys until your migration ends could be read for 3 years while it still has to stay secret. Recording it today is enough.
We find where your systems establish keys and sign: TLS endpoints, VPNs, SSH, certificates, code signing and the libraries underneath them. Each entry records the algorithm, the key length, the system, the vendor and how long the data it protects must stay secret.
Data that must stay secret for years is already at risk, because traffic recorded today can be decrypted once a large enough quantum computer exists. We rank systems by how long their data has to stay secret and by the deadline that applies to them, and move key establishment before signatures, the order federal policy sets.
We move key establishment to ML-KEM, usually first as a hybrid with the algorithm already in use, and signatures to ML-DSA or SLH-DSA, in FIPS 140-3 validated modules. A vendor product that cannot change yet goes on the plan with its replacement date.
Cryptographic modules and algorithms, explainedWhere the software allows it, we make the algorithm a setting, ready for FN-DSA and HQC when NIST finishes them.